Brenner Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)

2/7/2012 10:43 AM

RESPONSE

COMMUNICATIONS, TECHNOLOGY,
AND PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS

SUSAN W. BRENNER

†

In response to Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future
of Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA . L. R EV. 331 (2012).
I NTRODUCTION
I was honored to be asked to respond to Professor Bellin’s insightful
article, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present Sense Impres1
sions. Since I agree with much of what he says, my Response is limited
to two tasks: parsing the relationship between modes of communication and the present sense impression exception, and assessing the extent to which at least certain types of electronic communication might
be incorporated into the percipient witness requirement he proposes.
I. MODES OF C OMMUNICATION
In the introduction to his article, Professor Bellin states that the
present sense impression exception to the default rule barring hearsay
2
“is uniquely tethered to an oral . . . communication norm.” He also
notes that advocates of the exception assumed “that people would on3
ly communicate about unfolding events orally.”
†
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160 U. PA . L. R EV. 331 (2012).
2
Id. at 333.
3
Id.
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Professor Bellin argues that this assumption was, and is, an integral,
essential component of the rationale for recognizing the present sense
impression exception, because in an era of only oral communication,
“a person who uttered a statement about an unfolding event . . . would
invariably be speaking to someone nearby who was also able to observe
4
the same event.” He notes that the supporters of the exception contended that from this once-inevitable empirical circumstance, one
could derive “two separate guarantors of reliability”—
5
contemporaneity and corroboration. I will assume, for the purposes
of this analysis, that their contention was correct, i.e., that contemporaneity and corroboration are useful in ensuring the reliability of
statements offered as present sense impressions.
However, I take issue with Professor Bellin’s comments insofar as
they assume we can only derive these guarantors of reliability from
oral communications. As I noted above, he argues that the present
sense impression exception is “uniquely tethered to an oral” commu6
nication norm. I disagree.
It is one thing to point out that because the exception originated
in a world in which oral statements were the only way people could
7
communicate spontaneously about contemporaneous events, it is appropriate in that context. It is another to suggest that the exception is
only appropriate in that context. I would argue that the fact that the
exception is a product of proximate oral communication does not necessarily mean that it is limited to that type of communication.
4

Id.
Id. at 375.
6
Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
7
For the evolution of the present sense impression exception, see, for example,
Edward M. Imwinkelried, The Need to Resurrect the Present Sense Impression Hearsay Exception: A Relapse in Hearsay Policy, 52 H OW. L.J. 319, 326-30 (2009). In the era in which
the exception was evolving, people could communicate in writing, as well as orally, but
writing tended to be used for formal communication, e.g., for correspondence or for
news stories. Cf. Bellin, supra note 1, at 333-34. Prior to the rise of cyberspace, it was
not common for average citizens to carry writing materials in order to jot down stray
thoughts or document what they were“currently seeing, doing, and feeling.” Id. at 335.
That, of course, has changed dramatically, as one court noted,
5

given the ubiquity of communications in electronic media (e-mail, text messages, chat rooms, internet postings on servers like “myspace” or “youtube” or
on blogs, . . . etc.), it is not surprising that many statements involving observations of events surrounding us, statements regarding how we feel, our plans
and motives, and our feelings (emotional and physical) will be communicated
in electronic medium.
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 568-69 (D. Md. 2007).
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But that seems to be the premise of Professor Bellin’s article: he
appears to believe that the present sense impression exception and
electronic communications are necessarily incompatible, apparently
because he believes electronic communications cannot sustain the
guarantors of reliability (contemporaneity and corroboration) that are
associated with oral communications. I agree that electronic communications can fail to sustain either or both guarantors of reliability, but
I do not agree that such failure is inevitable in either or both respects.
I think it is better to analyze the potential for failure discretely by
dividing electronic communications into categories—tweets, texts,
emails, Facebook status updates, and so forth—and analyzing the extent to which communications in each category have the potential to
sustain the guarantors of reliability we have long assumed are associated with oral communications. As to the actual reliability of the latter
part of this analysis, Professor Bellin notes that declarants could fabricate oral observations by communicating them directly to others, recording them on a dedicated recording device, or leaving them on a
8
voicemail system. But he dismisses the risk of unreliability in this context, concluding that the “facial absurdity” of orally fabricating such
9
evidence would render it “of little value.”
There are, however, reported cases that involve the fabrication of
10
just such evidence. This, along with the fact that different types of
electronic communication may vary in the extent to which they can
support the guarantors of reliability Professor Bellin attributes to
oral communications, suggests that the two are not unitary constructs, i.e., that one is inherently likely to be reliable while the other
is inherently likely not to be reliable.
Since this Response is brief, I have neither the space nor the ambition to engage in a detailed analysis of the comparative reliability of
oral versus electronically mediated communications. But before I
leave this issue, I would like to comment on two other points.

8

See Bellin, supra note 1, at 362-63.
Id. at 363.
10
This commonly arises with fabricated 911 calls. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon,
No. 09-6046, 2011 WL 4829718, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2011); People v. Roche, 772
N.E.2d 1133, 1138-39 (N.Y. 2002); People v. Dalton, 629 N.Y.S.2d 86, 86 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995). It is reasonable to assume that these are the exceptions, i.e., that there are other reported and unreported cases in which the fabrication of oral evidence did not
come to light.
9
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A. “Mischievous Evidence”
In his introduction, Professor Bellin cites Twitter and Facebook’s
status updates as examples of electronic communication modalities
11
that are likely to be the source of “mischievous evidence,” a point he
returns to in a later section of his article. In the later section, he emphasizes the ease with which electronic communications can be used
12
to fabricate present sense impression evidence. He argues, first, that
the (presumed) “absence of other observers” makes it “more likely” that
someone will generate a “false or misleading statement,” and attributes
the lack of observers to the fact that Twitter and other electronic com13
munication media “physically distanc[e] the speaker” from others.
Electronic communication media do tend to distance us physically
from those with whom we communicate; a spatial disconnect is com14
mon, but not inevitable. However, this distance is not necessarily an
engine of fabrication. Courts have held, for example, that 911 emer15
gency calls can qualify as a present sense impression. In other words,
some courts have found that a physical disconnect between the party
who initiates oral communication and the party who receives such
communication is not a necessary indicator of fabrication. Indeed,
these courts tended to consider the time in which the caller had to
fabricate a story as the critical issue in determining whether the call
16
qualified under the present sense impression exception.

11

Bellin, supra note 1, at 334-35.
See id. at 362-66.
13
Id. at 362.
14
Conference attendees, law students, and others in similar situations, for example,
have been known to use texts, emails, tweets, and other electronic means to communicate with each other even though they simultaneously occupy the same physical space.
15
See, e.g., United States v. Boyce, No. 10-0533, 2011 WL 5078186, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 26, 2011); United States v. Campbell, 782 F. Supp. 1258, 1260-61 (N.D. Ill. 1991);
People v. Crow, No. 293645, 2010 WL 4628685, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2010);
People v. Spencer, 928 N.Y.S.2d 607, 607 (App. Div. 2011); Wilder v. Commonwealth,
687 S.E.2d 542, 546 (Va. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Seals, No. 63883-1-I, 2011 WL 1226896,
at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2011). But see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
16
Compare Campbell, 782 F. Supp. at 1260-61 (concluding that a call qualified as a
present sense impression because the caller did not have time to fabricate a story), with
People v. Dalton, 629 N.Y.S.2d 86, 86 (App. Div. 1995) (indicating that the record
showed the caller had time to “‘possibly fabricate’” a story (quoting People v. Wilson,
506 N.Y.S.2d 760, 760 (1986))). According to one source, an empirical study shows
that “the truth took longer to get out than a previously conceived lie, and . . . a lie fabricated on the spur of the moment required less than three seconds to create and utter.” Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot Live in the Past, 28 F LA . S T.
U. L. R EV. 907, 917 (2001) (citing John O. Greene et al., Planning and Control of Behavior During Deception, 11 H UM . C OMM . R ES . 335, 350-59 (1985)).
12
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And that brings us back to whether, for the purposes of this analysis, there is a legitimate distinction between oral and electronic communications. It might be easier to fabricate a textual communication
than an oral communication, but unless and until we have evidence
that clearly supports this proposition, it necessarily remains in the
realm of speculation. For now, it seems reasonable to assume (or,
perhaps more accurately, to continue to assume) that some observers
will be inclined to fabricate statements and will utilize whatever means
are at their disposal to achieve this end. The mere possibility of fabrication is not, I submit, enough to warrant imposing excessive restrictions on the use of electronically generated statements. That
solution would be overinclusive, in that it could deny courts access to
reliable evidence. The appropriate response is to utilize countermeasures, such as corroboration, that provide some assurance of the
17
integrity of a declarant’s statements.
B. Fabricating, Spinning, and Puffing
Professor Bellin also notes that “[i]ntentionally false statements
18
are only part of the problem.” He expresses concern about people
Electronic communications tend to increase the speed with which we communicate, but it is difficult to see how this circumstance alone undermines the integrity of
the present sense impression exception. As courts have noted, a pivotal inquiry in
determining the applicability of that exception is not the speed with which the lie travels, but instead our presumptive ability to fabricate the lie in the time that elapses between our observing the event at issue and the communication of our “sense
impression” to others. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 556 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir.
2009) (noting that “the fundamental premise behind the present-sense impression
exception” is “that contemporaneity ensures reliability because there is no time for
deliberate fabrication”). See generally McFarland, supra, at 917 (finding that it took, on
average, 2.967 seconds to create a “spontaneous lie”). One could, therefore, argue
that insofar as electronic communications increase the speed with which we communicate, they reinforce the reliability of the present sense impression. But see Bellin, supra
note 1, at 335-37 (noting limitations of contemporaneity as a guarantor of reliability).
The increased speed with which electronic communications travel also inferentially
supports the reliability of recorded present sense impressions since it ensures that
there is less of a gap between observation and communication of one’s impressions of
what one observed. James Bradley Thayer, who is perhaps the original champion of
the exception, supported it because he believed the temporal proximity between event
and declaration eliminated “any substantial concern about the quality of the declarant’s memory.” Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 327.
17
Because the possibility of fabrication in this context substantially preexists the
rise of electronic communication media, many courts have “read the [present sense
impression] exception to require such corroboration.” United States v. McElroy, 587
F.3d 73, 85 n.13 (1st Cir. 2009).
18
Bellin, supra note 1, at 364.
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(1) intentionally fabricating evidence in anticipation of litigation
and/or (2) exaggerating, “spin[ning],” or engaging in “puffery” in
19
their “postings on a social networking site.” His concern here is
that if “declarants take creative license with the truth in electronic
postings, their misleading assertions will be difficult to untangle
20
from the electronic record itself.”
My response to his first area of concern, i.e., prospective litigants
fabricating evidence designed to support their position, is that this is
nothing new. Prosecutions for attempts to obstruct justice by falsifying
21
or fabricating evidence are far from unusual in our court systems.
While it would be naïve to assume that the authorities detect and
prosecute all such attempts, it can be extraordinarily difficult to succeed in such an endeavor. Computer forensic analysts can ascertain
when, how, and by whom evidence was created, which can often reveal
the evidence’s true character; even if the evidence withstands such
scrutiny, other evidence presented at trial will often reveal that it is
22
inconsistent with the known facts and therefore fabricated. In other
words, it is one thing to fabricate evidence, but quite another to successfully utilize it to one’s advantage.
I am somewhat puzzled by Professor Bellin’s articulated concern
about exaggeration, spinning, and puffery in postings on social networking sites. One of the sources he cites for this proposition notes
(quite accurately, from what I know) that adolescents commonly blur
“lines between fact and fiction” in their postings on Facebook and
23
other sites. My immediate reaction to that observation was that it
understates the phenomenon, i.e., I do not believe it is only adolescents who blur the lines between “fact and fiction” in their postings on
social networking sites. While I suspect people tend to be “reasonably”
accurate in the personal information they post on such sites, they are,
after all, “social” networking sites.
As such, it seems reasonable to put about as much credence into
postings from those with whom you are not personally acquainted as
you would into comments from someone you met at a bar or a party
19

Id. at 363.
Id. at 364.
21
See, e.g., United States v. Thorson, 633 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming
the sentence of a defendant who falsified, fabricated, and produced documents during
an Internal Revenue Service audit and a grand jury investigation).
22
See, e.g., Brief of Appellee at 13, Thorson, 633 F.3d 312 (No. 07-4787) (providing
results of forensic computer analysis as evidence of guilt).
23
Bellin, supra note 1, at 363 n.116 (citing Katie Roiphe, The Language of Fakebook,
N.Y. T IMES , Aug. 15, 2010, at 2ST).
20
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or any other event that brought together people with no preexisting
connections. I, for one, do not see how the proliferation of online
postings from those who choose to frequent social networking sites
has any particular empirical relevance for the application of the present sense impression exception, aside from creating a mass of data to
which it may, or may not, apply.
*

*

*

I could, perhaps, comment further on particular aspects of Professor Bellin’s views on how and why the rise of electronic communication media has the potential to have a negative impact on the
application of the present sense impression exception to the default
rule barring hearsay. I assume—and I hope—that is not necessary.
I hope that I have made my point: electronic communication media
certainly create new opportunities for statements that may be offered into
evidence under the present sense impression exception. That is only to
be expected, since we have already dealt with one such opportunity.
As Professor Bellin explains at the beginning of his article, the early
proponents of the exception assumed it would apply (only) to statements made to “someone nearby who was also able to observe the same
24
event.” But it soon became apparent that it could also apply to comments communicated over the telephone, a circumstance courts even25
tually integrated into the exception. We therefore have experience in
adapting the present sense impression exception to the realities created
by emerging technologies. I suspect we will have little difficulty adapting the exception so that it can accommodate our use of social networking and whatever communication technologies evolve in the future.
II. P ERCIPIENT W ITNESS
Professor Bellin ultimately concludes that two approaches can be
used to limit the admissibility of “uncorroborated” statements trans24

Id. at 333.
Compare Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 494 A.2d 426, 434-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
(concluding that the victim’s statements made in a phone call to the police dispatcher
describing his victimization were inadmissible under the present sense exception because they were not made in the presence of another person), with State v. Essa, 955
N.E.2d 429, 448 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (determining that a statement the defendant’s
wife made in a phone conversation with her friend just before she died was admissible
under the present sense impression exception).
25
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26

mitted via electronic technology. One would require “corroboration,
in any form, of the substance of the statement”; the other, “narrower
approach would require corroboration in a specific form—a percipi27
ent witness.” He opts for the narrower approach, essentially because
he finds the broader approach’s reliance “on judges to make ad hoc
assessments” as to the reliability of corroborated statements offered
28
under the exception “unsatisfying.”
I tend to agree with Professor Bellin’s views on the importance of
corroboration. While I believe, as I explained above, we can incorporate the use of electronic communication technology into the present
sense impression, I, too, am concerned about the possibility of opening
trials up to potentially unreliable evidence. I think corroboration is the
obvious way to address this concern. I am not sure whether I share Professor Bellin’s reservations about the broader approach to achieving
corroboration, but for the initial purposes of this analysis, I will accept
his views and only address the position for which he advocates.
That position—the narrower approach—“requires statements admitted as present sense impressions to be communicated at trial by a percipient witness (i.e., someone who was present at the time the statement
29
was made) who ‘received’ (or made) the statement.” I can see the
possible utility of this requirement, but I am unable to evaluate its
specific utility in the present context because Professor Bellin does
not define what it means for the witness to be “present” at the time
the statement was made. “Presence” was an implicit, assumed element of the present sense impression exception when it was first developed because, as I noted earlier, it assumed face-to-face
communication between two people.
Electronic communication moves us far beyond traditional
face-to-face communication, at least in the spatial sense. For that reason, I assume Professor Bellin would not limit the applicability of this
narrower approach to instances in which the “speaker” and “recipient”
were physically proximate. To include such a limitation would take us
26

Bellin, supra note 1, at 366. Professor Bellin is concerned about the fact that,
while those who lobbied for the adoption of the exception assumed that statements
offered under the exception would be corroborated by testimony from a “percipient
witness,” the latter requirement “no longer applies to a large subset of present sense impressions.” Id. at 361. For the definition of percipient witness, see infra text accompanying note 29. The two approaches he refers to are designed to restore this requirement.
See Bellin, supra note 1, at 366-74 (describing how the “corroboration” and “percipient
witness” approaches impose checks on the admissibility of present sense impressions).
27
Bellin, supra note 1, at 366.
28
Id. at 367.
29
Id. at 370.
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back to where we started—doing nothing to integrate electronically
transmitted communications involving two or more nonphysically
proximate people into the present sense impression exception.
I wonder if Professor Bellin would be willing to modify the traditional definition of “presence” so that it could also accommodate a concept
of “electronic” presence? I wonder that because as I read his article, a
scenario occurred to me that incorporates the concept of “electronic”
presence and seems to address the concerns Professor Bellin notes with
regard to the admission of uncorroborated electronic communications.
Assume a version of events that occurred recently in the metropoli30
tan area in which I live: A young man and a young woman are sitting
in their car at an intersection waiting for a red light to change when
John Doe, driving at a very high rate, crashes into their car. Both are
killed instantly. Assume, further, that the incident occurred at 6:30 p.m.
on a Friday, when the nearby sidewalks were full of pedestrians who
were circulating between bars or on their way to nearby restaurants.
Assume, even further, that many of the pedestrians observed the
collision. While some called 911, others immediately began tweeting
and texting about what they had just seen. The driver of the car later
is charged with reckless driving and negligent homicide. The prosecutor would like to introduce some of the pedestrians’ tweets and texts
at trial under the present sense impression exception.
All of these people were clearly present when the accident happened. Does that mean they or, more properly, their texts and tweets
satisfy the requirements Professor Bellin would impose on the admissibility of such evidence? Who would be the percipient witness(es)?
Would those who read the tweets and texts qualify as such a witness?
Should they be considered to have been “present” when the statement
was made? And how does their being “present” at that place and on
that occasion (assuming we can apply these concepts in this context)
enhance the credibility of their testimony? All they really know is that
they read one or more electronic communications that purported to
describe accurately the accident and its aftermath.
I do not know the answers to those questions. I raise this scenario
because I think it illustrates another way electronic communications can
satisfy the corroboration requirement Professor Bellin (and I) see as essential to applying the present sense impression exception in this context.
It seems reasonable to me to treat the authors of our hypothetical
tweets and texts as percipient witnesses whose electronic communica30

See Doug Page, Man Charged in Fatal Crash; Students at Carroll, CJ Mourning the
Deaths of 2 Young Friends, D AYTON D AILY N EWS , Nov. 22, 2011, at B1.
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tions inferentially corroborate each other. Some courts have taken
this approach with 911 calls. In State v. Naugler, an Ohio court found
that 911 calls from two independent callers reporting that the driver
of a “gold Saturn automobile with Pennsylvania license plates,” which
was “traveling eastbound on Interstate 70,” was pointing either a gun
31
or “his finger as if it were a gun” in the direction of other motorists.
At the driver’s trial for carrying a concealed weapon, the prosecutor
sought to introduce these statements, but the driver’s attorney object32
ed that they were hearsay. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the
calls were properly admitted because the callers were describing an
event as they perceived it and because the statements corroborated
each other, i.e., they came from two independent callers, one from
Texas and one from Arizona, each of whom accurately described the
33
vehicle and its license plate number accurately to within one digit.
34
Other courts have reached similar conclusions.
I offer this suggestion because I have, for well over a decade, devoted much of my time to researching and writing about how our use
of cyberspace sometimes requires us to modify existing legal rules
but often does not. As I explain when I speak and write on this topic,
law—except for specialized areas such as patent and copyright—is
concerned with people, not with technology, as such. Given that, I
believe we need to be careful not to overestimate the impact technology has on existing law; in many instances, it may be possible to
accommodate uses of technology with rules as they exist or by tweaking them only slightly.
Here, it seems to me that our legal system has an opportunity to
take advantage of the tremendous amount of data our use of social
networking technology creates. Much of this data is worthless as far as
the law of evidence is concerned, but it can also create scenarios, like
the one outlined above, in which we have the recorded coincident
reactions of people who fortuitously observed the same event. It
seems to me that such data offers a new source of evidence and a new

31

No. CA2004-09-003, 2005 WL 3148081, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2005), aff’d,
855 N.E.2d 456 (Ohio 2006).
32
Id. at *3.
33
Id. at *4.
34
See, e.g., Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 703, 706-07 (S.D. Ga.
1993) (admitting present sense impressions where one known 911 caller and one unknown 911 caller made nearly identical statements shortly after an accident); Wooten v.
Newcon Transp., Inc., 632 S.E.2d 525, 529 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (admitting present
sense impressions where two unknown 911 callers made nearly identical statements
shortly after an accident).
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way to validate the reliability of that evidence: if we find consistency in
the independent, coincident tweets or texts of people who were reacting to the same event, then why should we not use the consistency of
their recorded observations to corroborate their accounts and thereby
establish the reliability of this evidence?
I, for one, am not particularly concerned about the possibility that
such data would be the product of fabrication. It is, of course, possible that individuals who have no other ties and are located in various
parts of the country could conspire to fabricate evidence on a given
occasion, but that would mean they would have to have prior
knowledge of the liability-generating event. If such a scenario were to
occur—if a group conspired to use social networking to fabricate favorable evidence admissible under the present sense impression exception—then it should not be difficult to uncover the plot. As I
noted earlier, computer forensic examiners are very skillful at finding
hidden clues—such as prior, relevant communications or other con35
nections between the conspirators.
C ONCLUSION
Looking back at what I have written, I fear I may have given Professor Bellin a bit of a hard time. That was definitely not my intention. I
found his article thought-provoking, and have taken advantage of this
opportunity to share some of those thoughts with you. I think he has
initiated what will no doubt be an ongoing, highly complex discussion
of this very important issue.

Preferred Citation: Susan W. Brenner, Response, Communications,
Technology, and Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 255
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35

See supra text accompanying note 22.

